Abstract
Introduction
The fundamental role of monetary and financial institutions for economic development is widely recognised by economic literature. Basic conditions, although quite rudimentary, in financial field conducive to economic advancement were made available in Ethiopia at the beginning of the XX century. Banking history of this African country starts just in those years.
There are five principal events, which may conveniently be taken as dividing Ethiopian The third event was, in 1943, establishment of the State Bank of Ethiopia, 2 marking the rebirth of the Ethiopian independent banking. This occurred during World War II after liberation of the country. The fourth event was the revolution of 1974, which wiped out the monarchy, nationalised companies and shaped a "socialist banking" two-tier model "suited"
to Ethiopia, the whole credit system being based on the central bank and three state-owned financial institutions, each of them enjoying monopoly in its respective market. 3 The fifth event was the collapse of socialist regime followed by a financial sector reform and , 1942, but one year later, in addition to its commercial banking functions, the Bank was entrusted with three basic duties of a central bank: controlling the issue of currency, holding the foreign reserves of the country and acting as the fiscal agent of the government (Deguefe 1973) . 3 The Ethiopian model of "socialist banking", unlike Soviet model applied to East European countries, was based on a two-tier system. First tier: National Bank of Ethiopia. Second tier: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Housing and Savings Bank, Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank. understandable motives of national pride he gave preference to an institution at least formally independent rather than to a much easier solution represented by opening a branch office of an expatriate bank. There are differing versions of the events, which led up to the constitution of this bank. According to Richard Pankhurst (1963) , who relies primarily on British sources, the first contacts were made with France, but later the Menelek's sympathies shifted towards Great Britain; therefore the important task of establishing a national bank in Abyssinia was entrusted only to that country. 7 A slightly different, and perhaps more complete version of the facts, suggests that the Emperor contacted envoys from a number of European countries asking to work together on this project (Mauri 1967, pp. 19-25) . While political and financial aspects of the project were being discussed in France, in Italy and in other European continental countries, the prompt British answer reached Addis Ababa. London was ready to provide assistance in this venture and felt it was best to entrust the task to the National Bank of Egypt, a private bank, under British control registered in Egypt as a limited company. During negotiations, in 1905, in exchange for granting to the entering institution a banking and note issuing monopoly in Abyssinia lasting fifty years, Menelek put forward three conditions:
(a)internationalisation of the institution on three tiers represented respectively by the shareholders, the Board of Directors and the management; (b) a number of seats in the Board to be reserved to Imperial nominees; (c) transfer to the Emperor of a substantial share of profits.
The last clause might have been regarded as a consideration for the concession of monopoly, while the first two aimed at limiting British influence in the Abyssinian bank due to the fact that presumably there would have emerged conflicting positions of representatives In addition to the thaler, the system included six fractional coins: three of silver and three of copper (Pankhurst 1965) . 7 " The first scheme for the institution of an Ethiopian bank seems to have made by a Frenchman, M. Delharbe, who visited Ethiopia at the turn of the century in the hope of setting up a State Bank which would issue paper money...but the project came to naught, … because Menilek was worried at French ambitions against Ethiopia as manifested in the dispute over the Jibuti railway. The idea of creating a banking system took a step forward …when Menilek, turning away from France, requested the British envoy Harrington to use his good offices to enlist his Government's support" (Pankhurst 1963, p. 92). of European countries within the Board of Directors. Drawing from the lesson of the railway project Djibouti-Addis Ababa (the concession granted by the Emperor to the French in 1894), according to Bahru Zewdie (1991), a conscious effort was made, at that time, to internationalise the banking venture.
The Bank of Abyssinia
Negotiations got off well and eventually, on March 11 th of the same year, a convention for establishing the bank was signed in Addis Ababa by the two parties (the Emperor of Ethiopia and the National Bank of Egypt). The convention, known as "Charter for the Bank of Abyssinia", drawn in a twin-Ianguage text (English and Amharic), had provisions which covered the main features to be conferred to the Bank 8 and listed the following eight privileges guaranteed to this institution by the Ethiopian Government for 50 years:
(1) banking monopoly,
the sole right to issue bank notes which were to be legal tender in the country,
the sole right to mint coins, (4) to be the sole financial agent of the Government,
preference for all issues of Government loans,
permission to build bonded warehouses, 8 Article I of the Charter specified on this matter: "the Company (the Bank of Abyssinia) shall have a capital of £500,000, of which at least £100,000, shall be subscribed and paid up when the Company is constituted. The capital may be increased as the necessity arises for doing so. The shares of the Bank of Abyssinia shall be offered for public subscription in London, Paris, New York, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Cairo and Addis Ababa, with the permission of the respective Governments concerned. The Head Office of this Bank will be at Addis Ababa, but the Bank may establish, both in Abyssinia and abroad, such agencies as it may consider advisable in the interests of the Bank. The duration of the Company shall be for 50 years from the day on which it is founded".
(7) free grant of all the land needed for the Bank's premises, (8) transport of its specie by rail in the country at Government rates.
The third article of the convention had a clause which Menelek felt very strongly about, requiring a 10 per cent of profit be placed in the reserve, to be distributed to shareholders a 7
per cent (presumably of paid-up capital) dividend, and 20 per cent of the remainder to be assigned to the Emperor in compensation for the privileges granted to the Bank. The final article (Article IV) laid down that the concession granted by the Emperor would be null and void in the case of the Bank not properly constituted before the first of July 1906 (Mauri 1967, pp. 25-28) . (Pollera, 1926) . At the outset of its activities Bank of Abyssinia ran into its first problems and obstacles; on the one side the Ethiopian Emperor, who perhaps too late had become fully aware of the British supremacy in running the Bank, and on the other side the Ethiopian public, yet unaccustomed to making use of bank services.
Menelek II, first of all, found it difficult to accept that the most important administrative Efforts were made to establish confidence on the exchangeability of the notes issued by the Bank of Abyssinia: the former aimed at the country's progress, the latter at gaining the confidence of the public for the expansion of its business. [1928] [1929] [1930] . Because of the country's backwardness, which made transfer of money quite difficult and expensive, large cash balances in specie were needed in branches. It is not therefore too surprising to find out that earning assets represented less than half of the Bank's total assets.
In part loans and investments were made in Egypt, primarily during the Bank's early years.
The usual lending of Bank of Abyssinia in Egypt was made by advances on securities, a type of transaction unknown in Ethiopia, where guaranteed loans, overdraft facilities and advances on goods, often stored in warehouses, were granted.
The annual interest rate charged on loans guaranteed by collateral was 12 per cent. In general an advance equalled 70 per cent of the value of goods. Overdraft on current accounts were almost exclusively granted to companies run by foreigners and were much favoured by the Bank since they allowed for the expansion of the use of deposit money, a medium of exchange evidenced only by figures in books, which entailed creation of money. In fact, as mentioned before, no compulsory reserve requirements were applied on deposit balances.
From the first days of this venture a great part of bank credit was channelled to financing international trade. In particular, the Bank was involved on the one hand in financing the collection and export of the primary commodities and on the other in financing distribution of imports of consumer goods. Its function was, of course, that of bridging the gap between the purchases of coffee, for example, from the farmers, to the time at which it was sold on international markets. Indigenous borrowers were discriminated by the adoption of "sound banking" canons tailored to suit needs and habits of more developed countries. For a limited period, however, mortgage loans were also made, but difficulties arisen in collection discouraged further transactions of this type. Finally are to be mentioned personal loans to Ethiopian citizens; these loans, requiring two guarantors, carried an interest rate of 15 per cent. The higher rate on these transactions was due mainly to procedural differences in debt collection depending on the borrower's status, European or native. Ethiopian subjects were, in fact, governed by customary law, which was somewhat primitive. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that Bank of Abyssinia had set part of its premises to use as a prison where recalcitrant debtors were held until their relatives settled the debts, accrued monthly not only with interests, but also with expenses for maintenance of prisoners (National Bank of Egypt, 1948).
Investments in British Government bonds were also important, as a second line liquidity reserve. During the World War, a large quantity of English National War 5% Bonds flowed into the Bank's portfolio. Even deposit operations were not as successful as had been hoped. In particular, the inflow of savings deposits was scarce because of a number of factors such as the modest branch network, the low level of per capita income, the early stage of monetary development of the country (very low monetisation ratio of the economy), the lack of confidence on the part of the public and the unattractive interest rate offered to depositors, i.e. 3% per annum. Current account deposits recorded better levels, since they were used by foreign businessmen and rich Ethiopian clients more accustomed to banking services and to the use of drawing cheques. However caution dissuaded directors from paying dividends until 1918 (see Table 1 164 thousand and overall deposits more than £. 250 thousand.
The Entry of Other Financial Institutions
The With this exception, all personnel were Ethiopian as was the institution's share capital (Pollera, 1926; Pankhurst, 1963 As far as the first query is concerned, it must be recalled that the Emperor had watched disappointedly as Bank of Abyssinia fell under British control through shareholding by National Bank of Egypt and did not approve in particular the lending policy followed by the Bank. The Bank was blamed to be unable to find local employment for its funds. In fact this institution, as a result of the European background of its managers, followed certain standards of credit-worthiness and imposed certain conditions as to a security of loans to be disbursed.
The credit policy of the Abyssinian bank, mainly oriented to financing foreign enterprises and wealthy clients in the country and international trade on the one hand and rationing loans to domestic small borrowers as farmers, traders, craftsmen, and householders on the other appeared to be inappropriate. A policy of severe credit rationing was mainly implemented through non-price mechanisms of transaction costs allocation to the borrowers, i.e. practices of manipulating non-interest terms in lending operations. As a result, the Bank of Abyssinia loan portfolio was highly concentrated in favour of large non-rationed wealthy borrowers.
Unsatisfied borrowers were forced to seek credit on informal financial market at much higher interest rates.
Menelek wanted therefore to establish a second bank in the country to fill the gaps of Bank of Abyssinia lending and by this way combating the scourge of usury. The SNEDAC's loans were granted at the annual rate of 10 per cent and generally backed by personal guarantees. SNEDAC's lending was concentrated in a segment of the market for loans on purpose neglected by Bank of Abyssinia and therefore the newly created financial institution was not felt as a competitor by the latter. In this way the conciliatory behaviour of the Abyssinian bank towards the newcomer may be easily understood.
Before reviewing the successive development of SNEDAC after French capital became involved, an historical digression must be made. The two major rival powers in Africa, the British and the French, had found a competition-ground also in Ethiopia. and to make, as a guarantee, a deposit in South Australia 5% bonds with an overall face value of 5,000 pounds with National Bank of Egypt. The guarantee deposit was to be freed gradually as Bank of Abyssinia notes were redeemed by the new Ethiopian bank and destroyed under the control of the Egyptian consulate in Addis Ababa.
The Bank of Abyssinia Goes into Liquidation

The Bank of Ethiopia
The Imperial Decree issued on August 29th, 1931 chartered the new bank as Bank of Ethiopia and also represented the first banking law ever passed in the country (Pellegrineschi, 1936) . With this decree, in fact, a regime of ex-ante authorization for banking industry was established and this provision was justified by attributing the qualification of public interest to banking operations. Relations with Ethiopian authorities were in fact much smoother than they had been for the former bank since Bank of Ethiopia Board members were appointed by the Government itself. 22 Reserves backing notes in circulation were: (1) money and ingots of gold, foreign currency and accounts with foreign banks, (2) bills of exchange or drafts payable in gold or money based on gold, (3) Government bonds payable in gold or money on the gold standard and with a maturity of at least one year, such bonds however never to exceed ten per cent of the total monetary reserve, (4) drafts or other bills guaranteed by negotiable securities or merchandise deposited with the Bank, (5) commercial bills of exchange bearing at least two signatures of traders of known solvency and redeemable within not more than 3 months , such bills however never to exceed 30% of the monetary reserve, (6) Ethiopian money redeemable in gold (Zervos 1936; Pankhurst 1965 ).
Bank of Ethiopia may be placed undoubtedly among the first Indigenous central banks established in Africa (Ahooja, 1965 ).
Bank of Ethiopia in its ability to influence the quantity of money and credit could foster the economic development of the country. The Bank however was run conservatively because the management, taken over from Bank of Abyssinia, preferred to keep on with the customary cautious policy of the previous bank. The pound sterling was maintained as unit of account even though in transactions with customers the use of Maria Theresa thalers prevailed by far.
The branch network was extended with the opening of an office in Gojam, at Debra Tabor.
23
Efforts to spread the use of national currency throughout the country 24 were eventually unsuccessful, but it should be mentioned that the main causes, which prevented the achievement of this ambitious goal were external and out of control of the Bank.
The Ethiopian Government decided to replace the silver standard of Bank of Abyssinia (full coverage of notes circulation in silver coins) with a gold exchange standard system, based on British pound sterling, even though only silver coins were circulating in the country.
Frequent and sharp fluctuations in the value of silver (high volatility of prices in the past experience) had suggested to abandon the silver standard and to adopt a monetary system based on gold; therefore minted silver was to be allowed to continue circulating, but only as token money. There was no circulation of minted gold and the new Ethiopian golden thaler was in fact to be only a virtual monetary unit.
A little less than a month after the Imperial decree was promulgated, an international crisis of the gold standard occurred. Bank of Ethiopia had to adapt to the new situation while its notes were covered by minted silver (Maria Theresa thalers) and foreign currency. Maria Theresa thalers served to maintain internal convertibility and thus to permit continued contacts with a domestic economy dominated by the Austrian silver coins as well as the settlement of trade balance's with a number of neighbouring countries. Conditioned by its political and economic international ties, Ethiopia sought to remain linked to British sterling even after this currency interrupted convertibility into gold on September 21st, 1931. 25 The dual reserve system of Bank of Ethiopia, due to the desire to link simultaneously the 23 Bank branches were in Addis Ababa, Dabra Tabor, Dessie, Diredawa, Gambela, Gore, Harar. 24 At this point it should be mentioned that the Bank of Ethiopia, although unwilling to undertake any obligation to indemnify all owners who claimed that their notes had been destroyed, promised to make restitution in special cases where unquestionable proof of such destruction was presented and provided the approval from the Ministry of Finance (Zervos 1936 , Pankhurst 1965 . 25 After a run on sterling in July 1931.
Ethiopian monetary unit to pound sterling and to silver, while silver prices underwent considerable fluctuations, was a cause of serious problems for the Bank. In facing these disturbances the Ethiopian bank tried to stabilize the silver thaler / pound sterling exchange rate. ln other words efforts of Bank of Ethiopia were directed to neutralize effects on the domestic market of fluctuations of silver prices on the London market. This policy caused a growth of smuggling on the borders of the country, mainly during periods marked by maximum divergence between the market price of silver and the Bank's official price (Bertone, 1936) .
Despite the difficulties, Bank of Ethiopia pursued the objective of increasing the use of national currency in the country and to enlarge its sphere of influence on the economy. Source: Bank of Ethiopia, Annual Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to evaluate correctly the results achieved by Bank of Ethiopia in developing bank notes circulation in the country it is necessary to take into consideration the circulation of foreign-minted silver coins during the same period of time. At this point it should be added that monetary reform also involved token coins by establishing a decimal based fractional currency system of nickel and bronze coins, fully backed by Maria Theresa thalers in the Bank's vaults.
The official stock of money within the country was, at that time, slightly less than 6. Demand deposits, chiefly made up with public funds, were not interest bearing and savings deposits accounted for one fifth of total deposits. Savings passbooks earned a modest rate, which did not reflect market conditions. This fact, together with a lack of a savings promotion campaigns, explains the unsatisfactory growth rate of deposit balances.
Earning assets were limited by the need to keep high idle cash balances in branch offices. Investment portfolio held Ethiopian and foreign Government bonds and bills. In addition the above rnentioned South Australia 5% bonds were deposited as security for notes redemption with National Bank of Egypt. In lending operations a very important role had discounting of international and national bills and promissory notes. Advances on securities and merchandise, whose term almost never exceeded six months, were also granted.
Merchandise was stored in the Bank's warehouses while precious metals were held in the Bank's vaults. An interest rate of 8 -10% was applied to these transactions. In addition Bank of Ethiopia continued to grant loans to Ethiopian individuals covered by personal guarantees.
Mortgage loans developed at a very modest rate. In conclusion it is undeniable that lending by the Ethiopian bank during the first years of operations was excessively prudent and that this institution did not take full advantage of its leading position to implement a lending policy conducive to speeding up economic development. However the judgement should not be too severe because of the short life of this institution. In fact the Italian invasion of Ethiopia interrupted the take off of this bank.
The Italian authorities, after the fall of Addis Ababa on May 5th, 1936, initially allowed normal activities of Bank of Ethiopia to be continued because some time was needed to make decisions on the Bank's future. They were faced in fact with two alternatives equally viable, but each tied to different views on the target structure of the banking system of the Horn of Africa. On the one hand there was the opportunity of keeping the Bank alive, changing its ownership (class A registered shares being transferred from the Ethiopian Government to the Italian Government), name, management and, partially, staff. This line of action, which had already been successfully followed dealing with Société Nationale d'Ethiopie, nonetheless entailed the adoption of an autonomous stance in the monetary and credit field which had not been taken in the past in the former colonies of Eritrea and Somalia, but which did not lack prominent supporters among Italian economists. On the other hand the view calling for a complete integration of Ethiopia as well as other Italian possessions in East Africa into the Italian monetary and banking system necessarily implied the liquidation of Bank of Ethiopia.
The second alternative, mainly based on political issues of the Fascist regime, finally prevailed.
